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Why Terrorism Works: Understanding the Threat, 
Responding to the Challenge
Alan Dershowitz
New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002 (271 pp.)
Reviewed by Russ Weninger†
Alan Dershowitz, in his fascinating book, Why Terrorism Works: Under-
standing the Threat, Responding to the Challenge,1 claims that terrorism 
can be part of a rational political strategy.2 He argues that Palestinian 
terrorism has historically been an example of such rational terrorism. 
Dershowitz contrasts this type of terrorism with megalomaniac terror-
ism, as employed by al-Qaeda. The former is capable of being discour-
aged, while the latter is not. 
Dershowitz argues that since rational terrorism is geared towards 
certain political interests, such as Palestinian statehood, it can be dis-
couraged by reacting in a way that decreases the apparent likelihood 
that those interests will be satisfied. To the extent that this is not done, 
terrorism will continue. By way of example, Dershowitz draws upon 
correlations between Palestinian hijackings and other terrorist acts on 
the one hand, and international recognition of the Palestinian people 
and the legitimacy of some of their complaints on the other. Dershowitz 
claims that Palestinian terrorism has led to such recognition and has 
therefore proven to be a rational strategy for promoting the Palestinian 
cause. 
The solution is then to react to acts of Palestinian terrorism by de-
nouncing those acts in the international arena and by hindering Palestin-
ian interests in recognition and statehood until such terrorism ceases. As 
he puts it: 
† Russ Weninger is a third year law student at Dalhousie University.
1 Alan Dershowitz, Why Terrorism Works (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002).
2 Dershowitz employs a notion of rationality which is arguably different from the common legal 
notion of reasonableness. In this notion, behaviour is rational to the extent that it promotes oneʼ’s 
subjective interests, whatever those interests may be.
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If the cause is just, it should be considered--in the order of its justness 
compared with that of other causes, discounted by the penalty that 
must be imposed for resorting to terrorism.3
Dershowitzʼ’s treatment of the Palestinian situation is one-sided. The 
actions of Israeli soldiers are characterized as being morally superior, 
regardless of civilian deaths at their hands, because they apparently do 
not directly target innocent civilians, but kill and impoverish civilians 
by accident. To the extent that the Palestinian people are complicit in 
supporting terrorism, he continues, they are collectively responsible 
anyway.
The manner in which Dershowitz correlates Palestinian terrorism 
with success for the Palestinian cause is also questionable. Such suc-
cess includes not only international recognition for their plight, but also 
the deaths of the victims of terrorism and the terrorists themselves, as 
well as the suffering of the Palestinian people. Since Dershowitz counts 
everything as a success, his thesis that Palestinian terrorism has been 
successful is trivialized. To be fair, he points out that actual success is 
less important, in terms of the continuance of terrorism, than perceived 
success. But, for Dershowitz, the perceptions that matter seem to be 
those of Machiavellian terrorist leaders hungry for death and publicity. 
While, tactically speaking, their perceptions should matter more than 
others, from a humanitarian perspective it seems odd to call the Pales-
tinian cause a success, international recognition notwithstanding. Put 
another way, Dershowitz sees in the Palestinian people a homogeneity 
of interests, and this is used as an excuse to hold Palestinians collec-
tively responsible for the actions of terrorists.    
Dershowitz has a different way of dealing with terrorism of the 
megalomaniac variety. Such terrorists are motivated by the interests of 
achieving martyrdom and happiness in the afterlife. Since it may be dif-
ficult to hinder such interests, Dershowitz suggests that those terrorists 
must be incapacitated rather than dissuaded, and that recourse to torture 
may be necessary. This last claim is definitely the most controversial.
One does not expect to find a proponent of torture among the ranks 
of civil libertarians. Nor does one expect an argument which advocates 
the use of torture to be reasoned, respectful of the rule of law, and moti-
3 Supra note 1 at 135.
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vated, to a degree, by compassion. The effect is almost psychedelic. The 
legal argument for torture is summed up as follows:
Constitutional democracies are, of course, constrained in 
the choices they may lawfully make. The Fifth Amendment 
prohibits compelled self-incrimination, which means that 
statements elicited by means of torture may not be introduced 
into evidence against the defendant who has been tortured. 
But if a suspect is given immunity and then tortured into 
providing information about a future terrorist act, his privilege 
against self-incrimination has not been violated. (Nor would it 
be violated if the information were elicited by means of “truth 
serum,” as Judge William Webster, the former head of the FBI 
and the CIA, has proposed--as long as the information and 
its fruits were not used against him in a criminal trial.) Nor 
has his right to be free from ʻ‘cruel and unusual punishment,ʼ’ 
since that provision of the Eighth Amendment has been 
interpreted to apply solely to punishment after conviction. 
The only constitutional barriers would be the ʻ‘due processʼ’ 
clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, which are 
quite general and sufficiently flexible to permit an argument 
that the only process ʻ‘dueʼ’ a terrorist suspected of refusing to 
disclose information necessary to prevent a terrorist attack is 
the requirement of probable cause and some degree of judicial 
supervision. [footnotes omitted]4 
Dershowitz admits to a slight wrinkle in the legal argument insofar as 
the United States is a signatory to the Geneva Convention Against Tor-
ture. However, the United States adopted the convention with the res-
ervation that it would only be bound to the extent that it was consistent 
with the Eighth Amendment, and American courts have decided that the 
Eighth Amendment does not prohibit the use of physical force to gather 
information necessary to save lives.5
More interesting is Dershowitzʼ’s moral argument for the permis-
sibility of judicially warranted, non-lethal torture. The first premise is 
that torture sometimes elicits accurate information. Given this fact, tor-
ture could possibly be used to prevent terrorist attacks and thereby save 
4 Supra note 1 at 135.
5 Supra note 1 at 136.
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lives. Dershowitz then adopts a rule utilitarian approach, which argues 
for adopting whatever rules lead to the best consequences overall. The 
claim is made that torture will happen anyway, whether being done cov-
ertly by law enforcement officials or by states who have been sub-con-
tracted as torturers by the United States.
Since torture will happen anyways, and since it can potentially be 
used to save lives, the project is to devise rules that will maximize the 
good consequences and minimize the bad. The requirement of a judicial 
warrant is one such rule. Another is that the method of torture employed 
should not cause death or lasting injury. A third requirement is that in-
formation acquired as a result of torture should not be admissible in 
court against the person tortured. Proposed methods include the use of 
a dental drill without anesthetic and the use of a sterilized needle under-
neath the suspectʼ’s fingernails. 
Dershowitz points out that there is prima facie inconsistency in sup-
porting the death penalty, as many Americanʼ’s do, yet not supporting the 
use of torture. He also points out that police and prosecutors frequently 
resort to what would likely amount to psychological torture when they 
threaten suspects with the possibility of prison rape. However, for those 
who oppose torture and the death penalty, not to mention threats of sex-
ual assault made by officials, there is no inconsistency.
As to the rest of the moral argument, Dershowitz may not have gone 
far enough in considering the consequences of torture. He acknowledges 
that states, rather than individuals, have historically committed the great-
est atrocities. Dershowitz even quotes an Italian official who refused to 
torture a suspected kidnapper in the interests of freeing a former prime 
minister, because “ʻ‘Italy can survive the loss of Aldo Moro, but it can-
not survive the introduction of torture.ʼ’”6 If we are not careful, torture 
may be with us long after Islamic terrorist groups cease to operate. 
Dershowitz also seems to avoid the really hard cases. What if the 
police have a suspect who has knowledge of an attack scheduled to 
occur within, say, an hour? To save lives, should the police forego the 
formalities of a warrant? Or what if time is not the issue, but rather the 
severity of the techniques employed? Someone willing to die for a cause 
may be willing to endure being poked with a needle underneath the fin-
gernails. What then? And what if mistakes are made?
5 Supra note 1 at 134.
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Finally, Dershowitz does not acknowledge what torture would do to 
the torturers themselves. Good people would likely be psychologically 
scarred for life and cruel people would have their sadism compounded. 
States, as a rule, should not be involved in the psychological corruption 
of their officials.     
In fact, Dershowitz considers other options besides torture. These 
include controlling the media, monitoring all communications, crimi-
nalizing the advocacy of terrorism, restricting movement, using collec-
tive punishment techniques, engaging in targeted assassinations, staging 
pre-emptive attacks, resorting to massive retaliation, conducting secret 
military trials, and torturing suspects. Dershowitz suggests that when 
evaluating possible responses to terrorism we should balance interests 
of security with the values of civil liberty and democratic accountabil-
ity. On the whole, Dershowitz appears more permissive of espionage 
and the use of force than he is of limiting freedom of expression and the 
jurisdiction of civilian courts, but even there he rejects absolutism.
Dershowitzʼ’s arguments should be taken seriously. What may be dis-
missed out of hand in the legal profession and academia as heresy, may 
be highly persuasive to the police forces, militaries, and spy agencies of 
the world. These arguments may also persuade politicians, policy mak-
ers, and the general public. To the extent that we are not happy with that 
we should have reasoned counter-arguments. Further, there is presumed 
utility in individuals and institutions having as accurate a sense of the 
limits of moral permissibility as possible. To the degree that Dershow-
itz helps us to elucidate those limits, this book should be regarded as a 
contribution of value.
